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I. INTRODUCTION
In a symposium celebrating the career and contributions of Professor
D. Michael Risinger, it seems appropriate to discuss an issue he has
considered and commented upon for many years—the challenge of
communicating forensic science findings to ordinary human beings, such as
those who serve on juries.1 I will focus on source conclusions, which are the
conclusions that forensic scientists reach after comparing items to evaluate
whether they have, or might have, a common source. Examples include
comparison of fingerprints, biological samples, tool marks, shoe prints, and
handwriting.
The question I will address is how forensic scientists should
communicate source conclusions in reports and testimony. The answer, I
will argue, depends on two issues: (1) what conclusions can be justified
logically and empirically;2 and (2) what conclusions (among those that can
be justified logically and empirically) are most likely to be understood and
used appropriately. I will first review various possible ways that forensic
scientists might report source conclusions, pointing out logical and empirical
difficulties with some reporting methods. Then I will discuss what is
currently known about lay understanding of such reports.
This analysis will, unfortunately, yield no ideal or preferred solution.
It will instead suggest that the legal system faces trade-offs: the reporting
formats that are easiest for lay people to understand are difficult to justify
logically and empirically, while reporting formats that are easier to justify
logically and empirically are more difficult for lay people to understand. To
find the best solution, I will argue, we need careful consideration of the
options and more empirical research.

1

Examples of Risinger’s commentary on this topic include D. Michael Risinger,
Reservations About Likelihood Ratios (and Some Other Aspects of Forensic ‘Bayesianism,’
12 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 63 (2012); D. Michael Risinger, Against Symbolization, 11
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 247 (2012).
2
There is wide agreement (I hope) that forensic scientists should be limited to
presenting conclusions that are scientifically valid. That is the essence of Rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the Daubert standard. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm.,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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II. THE LOGIC OF SOURCE CONCLUSIONS
Let’s begin by considering the logic of forensic comparison—that is,
the logical steps by which a forensic examiner may go from observations
about the physical characteristics of a pair of items to a conclusion about
whether the items have a common source. I will use fingerprint comparison
as an illustration because fingerprints are easy to understand and because the
logic of drawing conclusions from a fingerprint comparison is essentially
same as the logic of drawing conclusions from the comparison of other items,
such as footwear impressions, tool marks, bite marks, handwriting, and the
like.
The examiner’s goal is generally to assess two alternative hypotheses
about the origin of the prints being compared: (1) that the prints came from
the same finger; and (2) that the prints came from different fingers.
Examiners make this assessment based on the observed physical
characteristics of the prints, focusing particularly on similarities and
differences between the ridge patterns. The analysis is inherently
probabilistic; the only logical way for an examiner to derive source
conclusions is to consider the probability of the observed patterns under the
alternative hypotheses about their origin.3
Suppose that the ridge patterns of the two fingerprints appear quite
similar, but the examiner observes some small discrepancies. The examiner
must consider how likely those discrepancies are if the prints were made by
the same finger. This might involve consideration of the likelihood that
slipping or torsion of the finger, or some other process, could have distorted
one or both of the prints enough to produce the discrepancies. The examiner
must also consider the likelihood that the patterns would be as similar if the
prints were made by different fingers, which would require consideration of
the rarity of the shared features.4
3
Latent print examiners have only recently begun to recognize and acknowledge the
probabilistic nature of their analyses. Heidi Eldridge, The Shifting Landscape of Latent Print
Testimony: An American Perspective, 3. J. FORENSIC SCI. & MED. 72 (2017). In the past, it
was common for them to claim they were simply determining whether the ridge patterns
“match” or share unique features. Simon A. Cole, Forensics Without Uniqueness,
Conclusions Without Individualization: The New Epistemology of Forensic Identification, 8
LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 233 (2009); Simon A. Cole, Individualization is Dead, Long Live
Individualization! Reforms of Reporting Practices for Fingerprint Analysis in the United
States, 13 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 117 (2014). Whether they recognize it or not, this
determination requires them to think about the probability that any discrepancies between the
prints could have arisen if the prints came from the same finger, and the probability that the
similarities between the prints could have arisen if the prints were from different fingers.
4
For a detailed discussion and analysis of latent print examination, see William
Thompson, John Black, Anil Jain & Joseph Kadane, Forensic Science Assessments: A Quality
and Gap Analysis—Latent Fingerprint Examination, AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCI. (Sept. 2017), https://mcmprodaaas.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/reports/Latent%20Fi
ngerprint%20Report%20FINAL%209_14.pdf?i9xGS_EyMHnIPLG6INIUyZb66L5cLdlb
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It is the balance between these two likelihoods that allows inferences to
be drawn about whether the traces have a common source. The observed
results support the hypothesis of a common source to the extent that the
likelihood of the observed features is higher if the traces have a common
source than if they have a different source. The observed results support the
hypothesis of a different source to the extent that the likelihood of the
observed features is higher if the traces have a different source than if they
have a common source. That is the fundamental and inescapable logic of
forensic comparison; it applies regardless of how examiners choose to report
their conclusions, although some reporting methods do a better job than
others of making this logic transparent.5
III. POSSIBLE FORMATS FOR REPORTING
There are (at least) three schools of thought on how examiners should
report their conclusions. One approach requires the examiner to make
statements reflecting the balance of likelihoods. The examiner either makes
a statement about the relative likelihood of the observed findings under
alternative hypotheses or makes a statement about the strength of the forensic
evidence that is based on the balance of likelihoods.6 I will discuss variants
on this first approach to reporting in Part A.
A second approach, more common in the United States, requires a twostep analysis. First, the examiner compares the items, looking for
distinguishing features that would rule out the hypothesis that the items have
a common source.7 When distinguishing features are found, the examiner
[hereinafter AAAS REPORT].
5
More complete discussions of the logic of forensic inference can be found in BERNARD
ROBERTSON, G.A. VIGNAUX & CHARLES E.H. BERGER, INTERPRETING EVIDENCE: EVALUATING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (2d ed. 2016); COLIN AITKEN & FRANCO TARONI,
STATISTICS AND THE EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE FOR FORENSIC SCIENTISTS (2d ed. 2004);
COLIN AITKEN, PAUL ROBERTS & GRAHAM JACKSON, COMMUNICATING AND INTERPRETING
STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 1. FUNDAMENTALS OF
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICAL EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS (2010), http://www.rss.
org.uk/Images/PDF/influencing-change/rss-fundamentals-probability-statistical-evidence.pd
f.
6
See ROBERTSON, VIGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5; John Buckleton, A Framework
For Interpreting Evidence, in JOHN S. BUCKLETON, CHRIS M. TRIGGS & SIMON J. WALSH,
FORENSIC DNA EVIDENCE INTERPRETATION 27–63 (2005); Geoffrey Stewart Morrison, The
Likelihood-Ratio Framework and Forensic Evidence in Court: A Response to R v T., 15 INT’L
J. OF EVID. & PROOF 1–29 (2012); Graham Jackson, Understanding Forensic Science
Opinions, in HANDBOOK OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 419–45 (Jim Fraser & Robin Williams eds.,
2009).
7
Whether the hypothesis of common source can be ruled out is a decision made by the
examiner based on an assessment of the probability that the observed discrepancies would
occur if the items being compared have the same source. When the probability of the observed
discrepancies is sufficiently low, the examiner decides, in effect, to reject the hypothesis of a
common source and accept the hypothesis of a different source. There typically are no
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reports that the items do not have a common source—which is often called
“exclusion.” When the items cannot be distinguished (i.e., the hypothesis of
common source cannot be ruled out), then, as a second step, the examiner
makes an assessment of the rarity or distinctiveness of the shared features.
If the examiner believes the shared features are so distinctive as to be unique
(one-of-a-kind), the examiner may conclude (and report) that the items have
a common source—this conclusion is often called an individualization or
identification.8 If the examiner believes the shared features are not unique,
then several options exist. The examiner may make a statement about the
rarity of the matching features, or the probability that a random item of the
same type would have such features. Alternatively, the examiner might
simply report that the items are indistinguishable, or that they “match,”
without commenting on the rarity of the matching features. Finally, the
examiner might report that the comparison was inconclusive. I will discuss
variants on this two-step approach in Part B.
A third approach requires the examiner to draw conclusions about the
probability that the items have a common source, which can be expressed
either with numbers (e.g., “there is a 99% chance this bite mark was made
by the suspect”) or with words (e.g., “it is highly probable that these marks
were made by the same tool”). These conclusions are sometimes called
source probabilities. A distinctive feature of this third approach, which
distinguishes it from both the first approach (balance of likelihoods) and the
second approach (two-step analysis), is that it requires the examiner to take
a position or make assumptions about the prior odds that the items being
compared have a common source.9 In other words, the examiner’s
conclusion necessarily rests on something more than an evaluation of the
physical properties of the items being compared. I will discuss variants of
the source probability approach in Part C.

objective standards either for the estimation of probability or for the threshold of decision;
both are subjective judgments.
8
Eldridge, supra note 3; AAAS report, supra note 4.
9
See Jackson, supra note 6, at 426–27.
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A. Statements About the Balance of Likelihoods
1. Likelihood Ratios (LRs)
In Europe, forensic examiners often describe their perception of the
balance of likelihoods using numbers called likelihood ratios (LRs).10 LRs
represent the expert’s view of the relative probability of the observed
features under the alternative hypotheses about the source of the traces.11
LRs are commonly used in the United States to report the results of
comparisons involving mixed DNA samples.12 The analyst might report, for
example, that the genetic characteristics found in a mixed specimen are “X
times more likely” under one assumed hypothesis (e.g., “the specimen
consists of DNA from the suspect and an unknown person”) than under an
alternative hypothesis (e.g., “the specimen consists of DNA from two
unknown persons”).13 LRs have also been used to characterize the strength
of forensic voice comparison evidence.14
Forensic DNA analysts and forensic voice comparison analysts can
compute LRs based on databases and statistical models. In many fields of
forensic science, however, the empirical foundation for such estimates is
more limited. There are relatively few studies of the frequency of various
features of fingerprints, tool marks, bite marks, handwriting, footwear
impressions and the like.15 Furthermore, it is often difficult to model the
10

EUROPEAN NETWORK OF FORENSIC SCI. INSTS., ENFSI GUIDELINE FOR EVALUATIVE
REPORTING IN FORENSIC SCIENCE: STRENGTHENING THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC RESULTS
ACROSS EUROPE (2015), http://enfsi.eu/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/m1_guideline.pdf
[hereinafter ENFSI REPORT]; Wim Kerkhoff, Reinoud Stoel, Erwin Mattijssen & Rob
Hermsen, The Likelihood Ratio Approach in Cartridge and Bullet Comparison, 45 AFTE J.
284 (2013) (describing the adoption of the LR approach by the firearms section of the
Netherlands Forensic Institute); Charles E.H. Berger et al., Evidence Evaluation: A Response
to the Court of Appeal Judgment in R v. T, 51 SCI. & JUST. 43 (2011).
11
There is a simple mathematical description of the LR that lawyers and judges may
encounter when reviewing forensic evidence. Let E represent the observed features of two
traces that a forensic scientist is asked to compare; let Hs represent the hypothesis that the
items have the same source and Hd the hypothesis that they have a different source. The
likelihood ratio is then p(E|Hs)/p(E|Hd), which is read as “the probability of E given Hs over
the probability of E given Hd.”
12
JOHN BUTLER, FORENSIC DNA TYPING: BIOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND GENETICS OF
STR MARKERS ch. 22 (2d ed. 2005).
13
The LR for a particular comparison is the examiner’s estimate of p(E|Hs)/ p(E|Hd).
14
Geoffrey Stewart Morrison & William C. Thompson, Assessing the Admissibility of a
New Generation of Forensic Voice Comparison Testimony, 18 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.
326 (2017), http://www.stlr.org/download/volumes/volume18/morrisonThompson.pdf.
15
See generally NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 (2009), https://www.ncjrs
.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [hereinafter NAS REPORT); PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF
ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC
VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov
/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_science_report_final.pdf
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probability of obtaining specific sets of features because the individual
features are not necessarily statistically independent.16 Examiners in these
fields nevertheless make judgments about the probability of observing
particular sets of features under alternative hypotheses. Rather than relying
on empirical data and statistical modeling, however, they typically make a
subjective evaluation based on their training and experience. In some
instances, they can rely partly on empirical data and partly on training and
experience.17
The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (ENFSI) has
recommended that forensic examiners always use likelihood ratios to
evaluate and describe the strength of source conclusions, even if examiners
must make subjective judgments about the relevant likelihoods.18 While
some commentators (most notably Professor Risinger) have expressed
reservations about presenting LRs derived from subjective evaluations rather
than empirical data,19 the practice of presenting subjective likelihood ratios
appears to have taken hold in many European countries.20
Advocates of subjective LRs point out that a forensic examiner must
make subjective evaluations of likelihood in order to draw any conclusions
about whether two items have a common source.21 If the examiner is unable
to assess the relevant likelihoods, then the examiner has no basis for
evaluating the strength of the forensic evidence—and hence, should not be
reporting source conclusions at all. Asking examiners to report LRs is
simply asking them to use numbers to describe their subjective beliefs about
the relevant likelihoods. By making these beliefs explicit, examiners
increase the transparency of their inferential process, making it easier for
those who rely on their conclusions to evaluate and appreciate potential
weaknesses in the examiner’s logic or in the scientific foundations for the

[hereinafter PCAST REPORT].
16
See, e.g., AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 21–22 (citations omitted), which notes: “The
probability of finding a set of genetic features in a DNA test is relatively easy to estimate
because the features occur at rates that are statistically independent of one another. Statistical
dependencies are more likely for fingerprint features and will make it far more difficult to
estimate the frequency of combinations of features for fingerprints than for DNA profiles.
Consequently, research of this type, while important, is unlikely to yield quick answers.”
17
See, e.g., Alex Biedermann, Franco Taroni & Christophe Champod, How to Assign a
Likelihood Ratio in a Footwear Mark Case: An Analysis and Discussion in Light of R v. T.
11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 259 (2012).
18
ENFSI REPORT, supra note 10.
19
See Risinger, Reservations About LRs, supra note 1 (calling subjective LRs “numbers
from nowhere”).
20
Berger et al., supra note 1010; ENFSI REPORT, supra note 10.
21
Marjan J. Sjerps & Charles E.H. Berger, How Clear Is Transparent? Reporting Expert
Reasoning in Legal Cases, 11 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 317 (2012), https://academic.oup.c
om/lpr/article-pdf/11/4/317/2748435/mgs017.pdf.
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examiner’s conclusion.22
On the other hand, examiners may be reluctant to put specific numbers
on their subjective beliefs about the relevant likelihoods, even if those beliefs
are well-grounded. An examiner may justifiably believe that the observed
results are far more probable if the items being compared have the same
source than a different source, for example, without being able to say with
any precision how much more probable. Forcing examiners to articulate
numbers may lend a false air of precision to a subjective approximation.23
One way to deal with this problem is to allow examiners to express
conclusions about the balance of likelihoods using words rather than
numbers. In 2012, the Expert Working Group on Human Factors in Latent
Print Analysis, sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST), issued an important and carefully reasoned report that
suggested that latent print examiners avoid claiming they can link a latent
print to a single possible finger and instead make statements like the
following: “[I]t is far more probable that this degree of similarity would
occur when comparing the latent print with the defendant’s fingers than with
someone else’s fingers.24“ This is an imprecise verbal characterization of a
likelihood ratio designed to convey the examiner’s opinion that the balance
of likelihoods strongly favors the hypothesis of same-source.
Statements of this type may be easier to defend than seemingly precise
numerical LRs. An examiner who says the observed results are at least
10,000 times more likely if the prints were made by the same finger than
different fingers is likely to face skeptical questions about the basis for that
number, while a claim like “far more probable” may be more readily
accepted. Of course the problem of unwarranted precision is evaded at the
cost of imprecision, and perhaps obfuscation. Does “far more probable”
mean 10 times more likely, 100 times more likely, 1000 times more likely,
10,000 times more likely? Without quantification, the meaning of such
phrases can be unclear. Moreover, vague terminology may help examiners
evade legitimate questions about how accurately they can judge the relevant
probabilities, thereby obscuring the shaky scientific foundation for these

22

See Sjerps & Berger, supra note 21; Biederman, Taroni & Champod, supra note 17;
William C. Thompson, Hard Cases Make Bad Law: Reactions to R v. T., 11 LAW,
PROBABILITY & RISK 347 (2012), https://academic.oup.com/lpr/article-pdf/11/4/347/2748
692/mgs020.pdf.
23
See Risinger, Reservations, supra note 1, at 72 (“[T]here is something about the
generation of likelihood ratios with numbers from nowhere that tends to cover up the
weakness of the ingredients.”).
24
EXPERT WORKING GRP. ON HUMAN FACTORS IN LATENT PRINT ANALYSIS, NAT’L INST.
OF STANDARDS & TECH., LATENT PRINT EXAMINATION AND HUMAN FACTORS: IMPROVING THE
PRACTICE THROUGH A SYSTEMS APPROACH 134 (2012) ws680.nist.gov/publication/get_pd
f.cfm?pub_id=910745.
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judgments.25
2. Strength-of-Support Statements
LRs suffer the disadvantage of being difficult for lay people to
understand.26 As discussed later in this Article, people often mistakenly
believe LRs are a statement about the probability that a particular hypothesis
is true, rather than about the strength of the evidence for supporting a
particular hypothesis.27
One way to clarify the meaning of LRs is to translate them into a verbal
statement about the strength of the evidence for supporting a particular
hypothesis. An interesting example is the proposal of the United Kingdombased Association of Forensic Science Providers (AFSP)28 that forensic
scientists use the “verbal expressions” shown in Table 1 as a means of
explaining LRs in reports and testimony:
Table 1. Recommended Likelihood Ratio Terminology (AFSP, 2009)

Likelihood Ratio

Verbal Expression
(Strength of Support)

1–10

Weak or limited support

10–100
100–1,000
1000–10,000
10,000–1,000,000
>1,000,000

Moderate support
Moderately strong support
Strong support
Very strong support
Extremely strong support

25
What Professor Risinger, supra note 23, called “the weakness of the ingredients” may
be covered up as effectively by vague terminology as by subjectively generated numbers.
26
See Kristy A. Martire, Richard I. Kemp, Ian Watkins, Malindi A. Sayle & Ben R.
Newell, The Expression and Interpretation of Uncertain Forensic Science Evidence: Verbal
Equivalence, Evidence Strength, and the Weak Evidence Effect, 37 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 197
(2013), http://www2.psy.unsw.edu.au/users/bnewell/MKWSN2013.pdf; William C.
Thompson & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of Forensic Statistics: Evaluation of
Random Match Probabilities, Likelihood Ratios, and Verbal Equivalents, 39 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 332 (2015); Barbara A. Spellman, Alternative Suggestions for Communicating
Forensic Evidence, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 827. The question of how well lay people
understand LRs is discussed in more detail later in this article.
27
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26; William C. Thompson, Suzanne O. Kaasa &
Tiamoyo Peterson, Do Jurors Give Appropriate Weight to Forensic Identification Evidence?,
10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 359 (2013).
28
Ass’n of Forensic Sci. Providers, Standards for the Formulation of Evaluative
Forensic Science Expert Opinion, 49 SCI. & JUST. J. 161 (2009) [hereinafter AFSP Standards].
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Table 1 shows a range of verbal expressions designed to be presented
in place of (or along with) numerical LRs. For example, a forensic scientist
who determines (by whatever means) that the results observed in a forensic
comparison are 500 times more probable if the items have a common source
than if they have a different source would report that the comparison
provides “moderately strong” support for the conclusion that the items have
a common source.
The strength-of-support statements recommended by the AFSP were
not derived from empirical research; they simply reflect the best judgment
of that association as to the kind of reporting statements that will be correctly
understood by a lay audience. Later in this Article, I will discuss some recent
empirical research that casts light on whether lay people perceive these
statements to be as strong as the corresponding LRs.
B. Statements Based on a Two-Step Analysis
In a two-step analysis, the examiner first compares the items, looking
for distinguishing features that rule out the hypothesis that the items have a
common source. If no distinguishing features are found, the examiner then
considers the rarity or distinctiveness of the shared features, which can lead
to several different conclusions.
1. Identification/Individualization Based on Uniqueness of
Features
When examiners determine that the features shared by the items are
unique or one-of-a-kind, they may conclude, on that basis, that the two items
must have a common source. This conclusion is often called an
identification or individualization. In the United States latent print
examiners have traditionally limited themselves to reporting one of three
possible conclusions: that the prints being compared were made by the same
finger (identification/individualization), or that they were made by different
fingers (exclusion), or that the results of the comparison are inconclusive.29
In other pattern-matching disciplines, examiners are allowed to reach a
broader array of possible conclusions, but identification/individualization
based on uniqueness of features is among the conclusions that examiners
sometimes report.30
29

See supra note 3.
See the reporting standards for latent print examination, Guideline for the Articulation
of the Decision Making Process for Individualization in Friction Ridge Examination, SCI.
WORKING GRP. ON FRICTION RIDGE ANALYSIS, STUDY & TECH. (Mar. 13, 2013), clpex.c
om/swgfast/documents/articulation/130427_Articulation_1.0.pdf; tool mark examination,
Ass’n of Firearms & Tool Mark Examiners, Theory of Identification, AFTE J. (1992),
30
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The scientific basis for identification/individualization is weak. A
number of commentators have questioned whether forensic scientists can
accurately determine whether the features they examine are unique.31 In
2009, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) declared in an authoritative
report about the state of forensic science: “With the exception of nuclear
DNA analysis, however, no forensic method has been rigorously shown to
have the capacity to consistently and with a high degree of certainty,
demonstrate a connection between evidence and a specific individual or
source.”32 Ironically, DNA analysts typically report findings using
likelihood ratios or match probabilities; “identifications” are most likely to
be made in the very disciplines for which NAS found insufficient proof of a
capacity to connect evidence to a specific individual or source. The NAS
report called on forensic scientists to stop claiming that they can uniquely
identify the source of an item, saying “the concept of ‘uniquely associated
with’ must be replaced with a probabilistic association . . . .”33
Even for fingerprints, which are sometimes thought to be unique, it is
problematic for forensic examiners to claim they can identify individuals on
that basis. A 2017 American Association for the Advancement of Science
(AAAS) report on latent print examination explained the matter as follows:
Even if the ridge detail of every finger were unique and
unchangeable, it does not follow that every impression made by
every finger will always be distinguishable from every impression
made by any other finger, particularly if the impressions are of
poor quality (e.g., limited detail, smudged, distorted, overlaid on
another impression). By analogy, it may be that every human face
is unique, but we can still mistake one person for another,
particularly when comparing poor-quality photos.34

https://afte.org/about-us/what-is-afte/afte-theory-of-identification; Ronald G. Nichols,
Defending the Scientific Foundations of the Firearms and Tool Mark Identification
Discipline: Responding to Recent Challenges, 52 J. FORENSIC SCI. 586 (2007); document
examination, SWGDOC Standard Terminology for Expressing Conclusions of Forensic
Document Examiners, SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION (Jan.
2015),
http://www.swgdoc.org/index.php/standards/published-standards;
footwear
examination, SCI. WORKING GRP. FOR SHOEPRINT & TIRE TREAD EVID., Range of Conclusions
Standard for Footwear and Tire Impression Examinations (Mar. 2013), https://www.swgtre
ad.org/images/documents/standards/published/swgtread_10_conclusions_range_201303.pdf.
31
See Michael J. Saks & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Coming Paradigm Shift in Forensic
Identification Science, 309 SCI. 892 (2005); Cole (2009); Cole (2014), supra note 3; Jonathan
J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in Forensic Science: Still
Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187 (2010).
32
NAS REPORT, supra note 15, at 7.
33
Id. at 184.
34
AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 13.
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Based on a comprehensive review of the scientific literature on latent
print examination, the AAAS’s report concluded that a sufficient scientific
basis did not exist for the claim that latent print examiners can “identify” or
“individualize” a latent print:
Examiners may well be able to exclude the preponderance of the
human population as possible sources of a latent print, but there is
no scientific basis for estimating the number of people who could
not be excluded and there are no scientific criteria for determining
when the pool of possible sources is limited to a single person.35
The same problem arises in other forensic disciplines where examiners
claim to be able to identify the source of an item based on the uniqueness of
its features. Indeed, most of the pattern-matching disciplines have a weaker
scientific foundation than latent print examination; less is known about the
rarity of the features sets evaluated by examiners, and less is known about
the accuracy of examiners’ conclusions.36
2. Match Frequencies/Random Match Probabilities (RMPs)
After comparing items and finding no distinguishing features,
examiners following a two-step analysis sometimes report that the items are
indistinguishable, and then, to explain the probative value of this finding,
provide estimates of how frequently indistinguishable items would be found
in a reference population. This occurs most commonly in forensic DNA
analysis, where genetic databases provide an empirical basis for estimating
the frequency of DNA profiles in various human populations. Forensic DNA
analysts sometimes present these estimates as match frequencies—e.g., “The
blood stain at the crime scene and the reference blood sample from the
suspect have the same DNA profile. This DNA profile is estimated to occur
in 1 in 10 million people among Caucasian-Americans.” Alternatively, they
may present these estimates as random match probabilities (RMPs)—e.g.,
“The defendant could not be excluded as a possible contributor to the DNA
in the crime scene sample. The probability that a random CaucasianAmerican would fail to be excluded as a possible contributor is 0.0000001
or 1 in 10 million.”37 While experts could in principle use numbers to report
their subjective beliefs about the match probability, I am not aware of any
cases in which forensic examiners have done that. When numbers are
35
Id. at 5. The 2012 report of the NIST Expert Working Group, supra note 24, reached
the same conclusion.
36
See generally PCAST REPORT, supra note 15.
37
See Butler, supra note 12.
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reported, they are always derived from databases and statistical models.
Estimates based on empirical data and statistical models are far easier
to defend on scientific grounds than assertions about the uniqueness of
features or subjective estimates of the match probability. Questions can, of
course, be raised about whether the statistical models underlying the
estimates are appropriate and whether the databases represent relevant
reference populations.38 When relevant data are available, however,
empirically-based estimates of match frequency are undoubtedly preferable
to subjective evaluations based on experts’ training and experience. The
major barrier to wider use of this reporting method, as noted earlier, is that
most forensic disciplines do not have adequate databases from which to
make such estimates, and that statistical modeling may be complicated by
the lack of statistical independence of critical features observed when
making comparisons.
One limitation of this reporting method is that RMPs do not always
provide a complete account of the probative value of a forensic comparison.
RMPs do not take account of discrepancies between the items being
compared that may be too minor to justify exclusion but may nevertheless
undermine the probative value of the comparison, such as discrepancies
between fingerprints that may have arisen from distortion, or discrepancies
between DNA profiles that could have arisen from degradation or allelic
drop-out.39 In such instances, it may be better to report results using LRs
because match frequencies/RMPs provide an incomplete and potentially
38
For a general discussion of uncertainty and assumptions in modeling, see Steven P.
Lund & Hari Iyer, Likelihood Ratio as Weight of Forensic Evidence: A Closer Look, 122 J.
RES. NATL. INST. STAND. & TECH. 1 (2017); https://doi.org/10.6028/jres.122.027. For a
discussion of modeling assumptions and relevant reference populations in the field of forensic
voice comparison, see Morrison & Thompson, supra note 14; for a discussion of similar issues
in forensic DNA analysis, see DAVID H. KAYE, THE DOUBLE HELIX AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
(2010); William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of New Genetic Identification
Tests: Lessons From the “DNA War,” 84 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 22 (1993).
39
The problem can be understood most easily by comparing a match frequency with a
LR. The LR takes into account two probabilities: (1) the probability of the observed findings
if the items have the same source; and (2) the probability of the observed findings if the items
have a different source. Match frequencies/RMPs are statements only about the second
probability (2). In some cases, the second probability is all that needs to be considered. If
the observed findings were certain to be found if the items have a common source, i.e.,
p(E|Hs)=1.0, then all one need consider (to evaluate the strength of the evidence) is the
probability of the observed findings if the items have a different source. In such cases, the
match frequency or RMP is the complement of the LR and conveys the same information.
For example, a random match probability of 1 in 100 would be equivalent in strength to an
LR of 100. Problems arise, however, when the features observed when making a particular
comparison are ones that are not certain to be observed if the items have the same source, i.e.,
p(E|Hs)<1.0. This can occur when there are discrepancies between the items that make the
observed findings unlikely, but not impossible, under the hypothesis that there is a common
source.
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misleading account of the strength of the forensic comparison.40
3. Likelihood of Observed Correspondence
Some laboratories have opted to make qualitative statements about the
likelihood that the observed correspondence between the items could arise
randomly if the items do not have a common source. In other words, they
make verbal statements about the match frequency/RMPs, which may rest in
whole or in part on an examiner’s subjective judgment.41 For example, in
2015, the Defense Forensic Science Center (DFSC) of the Department of the
Army adopted the following reporting statement for positive latent print
comparisons: “The latent print on Exhibit ## and the record finger/palm
prints bearing the name XXXX have corresponding ridge detail. The
likelihood of observing this amount of correspondence when two
impressions are made by different sources is considered extremely low.”42
This statement is similar to the verbal statement about relative
likelihood recommended by the NIST Expert Working Group (as discussed
previously). The difference is that the Army statement addresses only the
likelihood of the observed pattern under the hypothesis of different source—
that is, it speaks only to the denominator of the likelihood ratio. In cases
where the likelihood of the observed evidence under the same-source
hypothesis is high, there may be little conceptual difference between the
Army statement and the NIST Expert Working Group statement, but the
Army approach could be misleading in cases where the numerator of the LRs
may be significantly less than one.43 This could arise where, for example,
two prints appear to share a distinctive set of features but also have
discrepancies that are difficult to explain under the same-source
hypothesis.44

40

See James M. Curran & John Buckleton, Inclusion Probabilities and Dropout, 55 J.
FORENSIC SCI. 1171–73 (2010) (discussing this issue in connection with forensic DNA
evidence); Morrison & Thompson, supra note 14, at 358–60 (discussing this issue in
connection with forensic voice comparison evidence).
41
These can be viewed as verbal statements of the examiner’s beliefs about the
likelihood p(E|Hd).
42
DEPT. OF THE ARMY DEFENSE FORENSIC SCI. CTR., INFORMATION PAPER RE: USE OF
THE TERM “IDENTIFICATION” IN LATENT PRINT TECHNICAL REPORTS 1 (2015), http://onin.com/
fp/DFSC_LP_Information_Paper_Nov_2015.pdf.
43
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
44
I offer further comments on the Army reporting statement in the concluding section of
this Article.
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4. Matches/Correspondence Without Frequencies or
Probabilities
Examiners sometimes report that they have compared items and found
them to be indistinguishable without providing information about the rarity
of the matching features or the probability of a random match. The examiner
might simply report that the items are “indistinguishable,” that they “match,”
or “correspond,” that one “cannot be excluded” from having the same source
as another, or similar language.45 Reports of this type are typically offered
when the examiner is uncertain about the rarity of the shared features, or
thinks the shared features are not particularly rare.
The problem with this approach is that it provides no meaningful
information about the probative value of the forensic evidence, and may
imply more than the examiner intends:
. . . recipients of an opinion expressed as a ‘match’ may translate
that into meaning that the two ‘matching’ samples share the same
origin. This would be different from the meaning that the scientist
would want to convey, namely that the samples share the same
attributes. So, even when scientists and laypeople use the same
word, the meaning to these two sets of people can be quite
different.46
Furthermore, even if the examiner clarifies that match means same
attributes rather than same source, the meaning of the “match” remains
unclear in the absence of information about the likelihood of observing those
attributes under alternative propositions about whether the items have a
common source. The probative value of the evidence is a matter about which
recipients must guess based on whatever knowledge or preconceptions they
have about the evidence in question.47
5. True and False Positive Rates
In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and
Technology (PCAST) issued an important report titled “Forensic Science in
Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of Feature-Comparison
Methods.”48 The PCAST report sets forth in considerable detail what is
required to establish the validity of a method for assessing whether two
items, such as fingerprints or tool marks, have a common source based on a
45

See Jackson, supra note 6, for a more complete account of terminology of this type.
Id. at 422.
47
Lay reactions to such testimony are discussed later in this Article. See infra note 78,
and accompanying text.
48
PCAST REPORT, supra note 15.
46
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comparison of their features. It emphasized the need for empirical testing to
establish the accuracy of each method: “Without appropriate estimates of
accuracy, an examiner’s statement that two samples are similar—or even
indistinguishable—is scientifically meaningless: it has no probative value,
and considerable potential for prejudicial impact. Nothing—not training,
personal experience nor professional practices—can substitute for adequate
empirical demonstration of accuracy.”49
PCAST recommended that forensic examiners disclose the error rates
observed in black-box validation studies on the method in question when
they report and testify about forensic comparisons.50 Under this approach,
error rate data become an integral part of forensic science reporting, allowing
the trier of fact better insight into the probative value of the expert’s
conclusion. When reporting an identification or exclusion, the examiner also
reports the rate of false identifications and false exclusion that have occurred
in validation studies of the method in question. This changes the nature of
the examiner’s report from an unqualified statement that the items have the
same source (or a different source) to a statement that the examiner has made
a determination that is related probabilistically to whether the items have the
same source. This shift in reporting makes the examiner’s conclusion easier
to justify logically and empirically, but may make the report more difficult
for recipients to understand and evaluate.
The PCAST report operated on the assumption that forensic scientists
will report categorically—that is, the examiner, after comparing items, will
report one of a limited number of conclusions, e.g., “identification,”
“exclusion,” or “inconclusive.” It is fairly easy to establish hit rates and false
positive rates when experts use a limited number of reporting categories.
Error rates are more difficult to evaluate when experts use continuous scales
(e.g., LRs or source probabilities), although with enough data it is possible
to establish the relationship between the numbers expert’s report and ground
truth.51 One might calculate, for example, how much more likely experts are
49

Id. at 46.
Black-box studies are designed to test examiners’ accuracy when comparing items
known (to researchers, but not examiners) to have the same source, or to have a different
source. The goal of these studies is to determine how often examiners correctly and
incorrectly determine the source of the items they are asked to compare. Ideally these studies
require examiners to evaluate items that are comparable to the items encountered in casework
following procedures that are as similar as possible to those used in casework. Id. at 66. See
also AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 43–51 (discussing ways to conduct empirical studies on
the accuracy of latent print examination).
51
For further discussion of the validation of likelihood ratios, see Geoffrey Stewart
Morrison, Measuring the Validity and Reliability of Forensic Likelihood-Ratio Systems, 51
SCI. & JUST. 91 (2011), and Didier Meuwly, Daniel Ramos & Rudolf Haraksim, A Guideline
For the Validation of Likelihood Ratio Methods Used For Forensic Evidence Evaluation, 276
FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 142 (2017), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0379073
50
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to report a LR in a given range (e.g., 10–100) when evaluating same-source
samples than different-source samples. Research of this type would be
helpful for determining whether LR estimates are well-calibrated and for
identifying weaknesses in LR-based methods, although results of this type
will undoubtedly be more difficult to explain to juries than hit rates and false
positive rates for a categorical reporting system.
C. Statements Based, in Part, on Prior Odds of a Common Source
One virtue of the reporting methods discussed thus far is that examiners
can reach the reported conclusions by examining and comparing the items in
question without giving any consideration to other evidence in the case. For
example, a latent print examiner can reach conclusions based on an
evaluation of the ridge patterns and other features of the prints being
compared. The examiner need not consider any other evidence (e.g., DNA
test results; investigative facts; witness statements; suspect’s alibi) that bears
on the claim that the prints have a common source. These approaches are
therefore consistent with a recommendation of the National Commission on
Forensic Science that forensic scientists avoid being influenced by “taskirrelevant” information.52 According to the National Commission, forensic
scientists should draw source conclusions by considering the physical
properties of the items being compared and any information needed to
evaluate likelihood of observing those properties under relevant hypotheses
about the source of the items. The Commission offered persuasive reasons
why forensic scientists should not consider other information about the case,
even if that information can be used to draw inferences about whether the
items have a common source. For example, information that a suspect
confessed to touching an item might support an inference that a fingerprint
found on the item is his, but a latent print examiner should not consider that
information because the examiner is supposed to draw conclusions from an
examination of the prints, not from other evidence in the case.53
816301359.
52
Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Views of the Commission: Ensuring That Forensic
Analysis is Based Upon Task-Relevant Information (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.justice.go
v/archives/ncfs/file/818196/download [hereinafter National Commission, 2015].
53
For additional discussion of the concept of task-relevance, and of reasons forensic
scientists should avoid being influenced by task-irrelevant information, see William C.
Thompson, Determining the Proper Evidentiary Basis for an Expert Opinion: What Do
Experts Need to Know and When Do They Know Too Much?, in BLINDING AS A SOLUTION TO
BIAS IN BIOMEDICAL SCIENCE AND THE COURTS: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 133–49
(Christopher T. Robertson & Aaron S. Kesselheim eds., 2016) [hereafter Thompson, 2016];
William C. Thompson, What Role Should Investigative Facts Play in the Evaluation of
Scientific Evidence?, 43 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC. SCI. 123 (2011); D. Michael Risinger, Michael
J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosental, The Daubert/Kumho Implications of
Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90
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Despite the Commission’s recommendation, forensic scientists
sometimes report source conclusions in a way that requires them to evaluate
or make assumptions about the prior odds that the items being compared
have a common source.54 These reporting statements require the examiner,
either implicitly or explicitly, to make assumptions or draw conclusions
about the strength of the other evidence for supporting the hypotheses of a
common source. Because this method of reaching source conclusions differs
in this important way from both the first approach (balance of likelihoods)
and the second approach (two-step analysis), I discuss it here as a third major
approach to reporting. Using this third approach, examiners can reach two
kinds of conclusions that are not logically possible under the first two
approaches.
1. Statements About Source Probability
Forensic examiners sometimes offer opinions on the probability that
two items have a common source. Opinions of this type can be expressed
quantitatively, using probabilities or percentages. For example, a forensic
scientist might say there is a 99% chance that two items have a common
source. It is more common, however, for examiners to express such
conclusions with words rather than numbers. For example, the forensic
scientist might say it is “moderately probable;” or “highly probable;” or
“practically certain” that two items have a common source.55
A number of commentators have criticized this reporting method on
grounds that it requires forensic scientists to look beyond the forensic
evidence and consider (or take positions) on matters beyond their expertise,
matters that have traditionally been left to the trier-of-fact in criminal cases
rather than evaluated by experts.56 The simplest way to illustrate this point
CAL. L. REV. 1 (2002).
54
I borrow the term prior odds from the field of Bayesian statistical inference where it
is used to refer to an evaluator’s perception of the odds that a hypothesis is true before
considering a relevant item of evidence. For example, in a latent print analysis, the prior odds
would be the examiner’s perception of the odds that the prints in question have a common
source before conducting the examination of the prints. Bayesian statistical analysis concerns
that manner in which an evaluator’s prior odds should be updated in light of new evidence.
See ROBERTSON, VAGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5.
55
See Jackson, supra note 6.
56
After comparing two items, a forensic examiner may be able to estimate the likelihood
of the observed results under the alternative hypotheses: p(E|Hs) and p(E|Hd). But these
likelihoods are not the same as source probabilities; source probabilities are the inverse of
these conditionals—i.e., p(Hs|E) and p(Hd|E). To infer source probabilities from the
likelihoods, the examiner must take into account the prior probability that the items have the
same source, p(Hs), or different source, p(Hd). According to Bayes’ rule, p(Hs|E)/p(Hd|E) =
p(Hs)/p(Hd) x p(E|Hs)/ p(E|Hd). This means that conclusions about source probability cannot
rest solely on what the examiner observes when making the comparison but must also depend
on assumptions or conclusions about the a priori probability the items have the same source.
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is with an example. Suppose that a DNA analysis shows that a bloodstain
found at a crime scene has the same DNA profile as a particular suspect.
How rare would that profile need to be in order for an examiner to conclude
that it probably came from the suspect? Suppose, for example, that the DNA
profile in question would be found in only one person in 1 million in the
general population. Would that be rare enough to justify a conclusion that
the profile probably came from the suspect?
A moment’s reflection should make it clear that the forensic scientist
can draw no conclusion about the source probability based solely on the
information given so far. To assess source probabilities, the forensic
scientist must also consider (or make assumptions about) other evidence in
the case. Consider that in a nation as large as the United States there are
likely to be over 300 people who share the one-in-a-million DNA profile
found in the bloodstain. If there was no other evidence of the suspect’s guilt,
beyond the DNA match, then it is not necessarily likely that he, rather
someone else with the matching profile, was the source of the bloodstain.57
Indeed, if the suspect has a solid alibi, it might be far more likely that the
bloodstain came from someone else, notwithstanding the DNA match. On
the other hand, if the suspect already appeared likely, based on other
evidence, to be the source of the bloodstain, then finding he also shares the
one-in-a-million DNA profile with the bloodstain might well support a
conclusion that he is likely to be the source of the stain. My point is that the
source probability cannot be inferred from the DNA evidence alone; it also
depends on how strongly other evidence points toward or away from the
suspect.
The same problem arises when forensic examiners attempt to infer
source probabilities from any type of forensic evidence. This is an inherent
problem of source probabilities. Even if the examiner does not realize it, a
statement that a suspect is “highly likely” to be the source of a bloodstain,
for example, necessarily rests, in part, on an implicit assessment or
assumption about the prior odds that the suspect is the source. Making those
assessments or assumptions takes forensic scientists beyond their scientific
expertise in ways that arguably usurp the role of legal fact-finders. Experts
are rarely in a good position to evaluate the prior odds that the items they are
comparing have a common source, and arguably have no business doing so.
Consequently, many commentators have suggested that forensic experts
Consequently, examiners must necessarily consider or make assumptions about matters
beyond forensic science in order to reach source conclusions. See, I.W. Evett, Toward a
Uniform Framework For Reporting Opinions in Forensic Science Casework, 38 SCI. & JUST.
198 (1998); Buckleton, supra note 6; Morrison, supra note 6; ROBERTON, VIGNAUX &
BERGER, supra note 5; Thompson (2012), supra note 22.
57
There might be little or no evidence of a suspect’s guilt other than a DNA match in a
case in which the suspect is identified through a “cold-hit” in a search of a large database.
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avoid presenting source probabilities.58
As Professor Redmayne
explained: . . . the expert should not testify in terms such as . . . : the blood
probably came from the defendant”, because one can only reach conclusions
of this sort by making assumptions about the strength of other evidence
against the defendant.59
Forensic scientists who report in this manner arguably have a special
obligation to explain in their reports and testimony that their conclusions are
not based solely on a comparison of the items in question but also rest partly
on their assumptions about the strength of other evidence: “Unless the
receiver of the opinion understands the prior, non-scientific information that
influenced the scientist, there can be no assessment of the reliability and
fairness of the opinion.”60
2. Identifications Without Uniqueness
The same problem sometimes arises when forensic scientists claim to
have “identified” or “individualized” the source of an item. In recent years,
forensic scientists in pattern matching disciplines have begun to
acknowledge that they do not have a scientific basis for determining whether
the features of a particular item (e.g., a latent print) are unique in the entire
world. For example, some latent print examiners no longer claim to be able
to associate a particular latent print to a single finger to the exclusion of all
other fingers in the world. They nevertheless claim to know (or be able to
determine) whether the features of a latent print are rare enough that they are
unlikely to be duplicated among the smaller group of individuals who are
possible sources of a particular latent print. They reason that the possible
sources of a latent print at a typical crime scene is likely to be limited to
people with access to the scene, and this group (which is sometimes called
“the relevant population”) may be much, much smaller than the entire human
population. Consequently, to identify the suspect as the source of the latent
print in question, they do not need to know whether the features shared by
the latent print and his print are unique in the entire world; they just need to
know that those shared features are sufficiently rare that it is unlikely another
member of the relevant population will have those same features. Thus it is
possible to have identification without uniqueness.61

58

Evett, supra note 56; Buckleton, supra note 6; Morrison, supra note 6; ROBERTON,
VIGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5; Thompson (2012), supra note 22.
59
MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 46 (2001).
60
Jackson, supra note 6, at 426.
61
Another way to explain this approach is to say the examiner’s assessment of the
“uniqueness” of the observed features is made with respect to a limited, localized subpopulation, rather than for the entire population of such items.
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While the logic of this approach seems sound, it clearly requires the
examiner to consider matters beyond the characteristics of the items being
compared. The examiner must determine that the suspect is a member of the
relevant population—e.g., a possible source of the latent print, which
presumably entails either an evaluation of, or assumptions about, the strength
of any alibi the suspect might advance. It also requires the examiner to know
enough about the case to judge the size of the relevant population—i.e., how
many people other than the suspect might have been the source of the item
in question. That, in turn, requires the examiner to consider, or make
assumptions about, a number of matters that are likely to be contested if the
case is tried. So, like examiners who present source probabilities, examiners
who make identifications in this manner must make assumptions about the
strength of other evidence against the suspect.
As with source probabilities, examiners who “identify” the source of
items in this manner arguably incur a special obligation to disclose their
underlying assumptions.
Suppose, for example, that an examiner
“identified” an individual as the source of a particular item based, in part, on
the assumption that the suspect was one of a small number of people who
could have been the source. Without knowing that the examiner’s
conclusion depended on this assumption, recipients of this information have
no way to assess whether the conclusion is reasonable and fair.62 Even if the
assumption is disclosed, it might be difficult for recipients to judge the
probative value of this evidence, particularly if they had reason to question
or disagree with the examiner’s assumption.63
IV. EVALUATING LAY REACTIONS TO FORENSIC EVIDENCE
Having discussed various ways source conclusions might be presented
in reports and testimony, I will now turn to the question of how the
presentation format affects lay people’s perceptions of this evidence. This
requires discussion of a growing body of research on lay reactions to forensic
science evidence.64
62

See Jackson, supra note 6, at 426.
To avoid “double-counting” of evidence, a fact-finder would need to assess the
“incremental probative value” of the expert’s conclusion, which is the value added by the
examiner’s opinion beyond the value provided by other evidence in the case that the factfinder has already considered. See Thompson, 2016, supra note 53, for explanation of this
point.
64
For recent reviews of this literature, see Graham Jackson, David H. Kaye, Cedric
Neumann, Anjali Ranadive & Valerie F. Reyna, Communicating the Results of Forensic
Science Examinations: Final Technical Report for NIST Award 70NANB12H014 (Penn State
Law Research Paper No. 22-2015, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abst
ract_id=2690899; Dawn McQuiston-Surrett & Michael J. Saks, Communicating Opinion
Evidence in the Forensic Identification Sciences: Accuracy and Impact, 59 HASTINGS L.J.
1159 (2008). For reviews of earlier studies, see D.H. Kaye & Jonathan J. Koehler, Can Jurors
63
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The most common method for studying lay reactions is a trial
simulation study in which participants are asked to evaluate hypothetical
criminal cases while the researchers experimentally vary the nature of the
evidence. Studies relevant to forensic evidence have experimentally varied
whether the evidence against the defendant includes (or does not include)
testimony of a forensic examiner; these studies have also varied the type and
strength of the forensic science evidence and the presentation format.65 The
studies differ in how elaborately they present the hypothetical case, ranging
from simple written summaries of evidence to elaborate simulations of trial
testimony. Participants in these studies also vary, ranging from
undergraduates, to participants in online research panels, to people recruited
from jury pools.
A. Lay Perceptions of the Relative Strength of Various Reporting
Statements
Studies that have tested the effects of presentation format on people’s
reactions to forensic science evidence have often found that the format
makes a difference. Presentations that should logically be given the same
weight are sometimes treated differently. For example, Thompson and
Schumann66 found that participants in a trial simulation study gave more
weight to statements about conditional probability (e.g., “a two percent
chance the defendant’s hair would be indistinguishable . . . if he were
innocent”) than statements that focused on the percentage and number (“2%
of people would be indistinguishable; that would be 20,000 in a city of 1
million”). Goodman67 and Lindsey et al.68 found that people gave more
weight to RMPs when stated as percentages (e.g., 1/10th of 1%) than
frequencies (1 in 1000).
Koehler and his colleagues have also shown that minor (and logically
irrelevant) variations in the way statistics are presented in connection with a
forensic match can have striking effects on the weight people give the
Understand Probabilistic Evidence?, 154 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC. 75 (1991); William C.
Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evidence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 9 (1989).
65
Some of the studies employ between-subject designs in which different versions of the
case are presented to different groups of participants. Some of the studies employ withinsubject designs in which participants evaluate the case before and after receiving forensic
evidence.
66
William C. Thompson & Edward L. Schumann, Interpretation of Statistical Evidence
in Criminal Trials: The Prosecutor’s Fallacy and the Defense Attorney’s Fallacy, 11 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1987).
67
Jane Goodman, Jurors’ Comprehension and Assessment of Probabilistic Evidence, 16
AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 361 (1992).
68
Samuel Lindsey, Ralph Hertwig & Gerd Gigerenzer, Communicating Statistical DNA
Evidence, 43 JURIMETRICS 147 (2003).
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evidence. For example, participants in a trial simulation study gave much
more weight to a DNA match when the random match probability was
expressed as a percentage using language that focuses on the suspect (“the
probability the suspect would match the blood drops if he is not their source
is 0.1%”) than when it was expressed as a frequency within a broader
reference group (“One in 1000 people in Houston would also match the
blood drops”).69 This effect probably arises from people’s tendency to
evaluate the strength of a forensic match according to the ease with which
they can imagine that other people, besides the suspect, might match.
According to “exemplar cueing theory,” formats that draw attention to the
number of people who could match in a large population make it easier to
imagine false matches occurring, which reduces the impact of the forensic
evidence.70
Several studies have compared perceptions of LRs with perceptions of
comparable match frequencies (or RMPs), although the results have been
mixed. Koehler found that jury-eligible students judging a DNA case gave
more weight to LRs (100 times more likely) than comparable match
frequencies (1 person out of every 100).71 Nance and Morris conducted two
important studies with members of a jury pool.72 In both studies they found
that participants gave significantly more weight to LRs than RMPs, but only
when the LRs were accompanied by a chart explaining how to update a prior
probability in light of a LR. Without the chart, the weight given LRs and
RMPs did not significantly differ. Thompson & Newman73 found that
participants recruited from an online labor pool did not differ in the weight
they gave LRs and RMPs when evaluating DNA evidence; but found
participants gave more weight to RMPs than LRs when evaluating shoe print
evidence.
With some colleagues at the University of California, Irvine I have
recently been studying lay perceptions of the relative strength of various
conclusions that a forensic scientist might present about whether two items
(fingerprints; biological samples) have a common source.74 We adopted a
69
Jonathan J. Koehler, When Are People Persuaded by DNA Match Statistics?, 25 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 493 (2001).
70
Jonathan J. Koehler & Laura Maachi, Thinking About Low Probability Events: An
Exemplar-Cuing Theory, 15 PSYCH. SCI. 540 (2004).
71
Jonathan J. Koehler, On Conveying the Probative Value of DNA Evidence:
Frequencies, Likelihood Ratios and Error Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 859 (1996).
72
Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats
for Trace Evidence With a Relatively Large and Quantifiable Random Match Probability, 42
JURIMETRICS J. 403 (2002); Dale A. Nance & Scott B. Morris, Juror Understanding of DNA
Evidence: An Empirical Assessment of Presentation Formats for Trace Evidence with a
Relatively Small Random Match Probability, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 395 (2005).
73
Supra note 26.
74
The materials reported here are drawn from a working paper: William C. Thompson,,
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method known as paired comparison that was originally used in the field of
psychometrics to study perceptions of the strength of physical stimuli (e.g.,
the brightness of a light, the intensity of a sound).75 In a series of studies, we
presented statements to participants76 in pairs and asked participants to judge
which statement indicated the evidence was stronger for proving the items
have a common source. For example, in one study participants were asked
to evaluate the relative strength of two statements about the result of a
fingerprint comparison: (1) the examiner’s claim to have “identified” the
prints as coming from the same finger, or (2) the examiner’s claim that “the
likelihood of observing this amount of corresponding ridge detail when two
fingerprints are made by different people is less than 1 in 100,000.” Various
statements were paired randomly and each participant was asked to evaluate
the relative strength of about sixteen random pairs. By combining data
across participants, we were able to generate rankings of the perceived
strength of the statements, relative to one another. By fitting the data to
statistical models we were able to assess the statistical significance of
differences in rankings.77
Our results suggest that statements involving large numbers—either
RMPs and LRs—are perceived as very powerful. For a fingerprint
comparison, a RMP of 1 in 100,000 was as strong as the categorical
statement that the examiner had “identified” or “individualized” the print;
the RMP of 1 in 10 million was even stronger. For DNA evidence, a LR of
100,000 was as strong as the categorical statement that the evidence proved
the suspect “was the source;” and a LR of 10 million was stronger still.

Rebecca Grady, Eric Lai & Hal S. Stern, Perceived Strength of Forensic Scientists’ Reporting
Statements About Source Conclusions (Dec. 10, 2017) (unpublished draft) (on file with
authors). A version of this paper has been accepted for publication in the journal Law,
Probability and Risk.
75
People have difficulty providing meaningful evaluations of the strength of such stimuli
on rating scales (e.g., “How loud is this sound on a scale of 1-10?”). Responses tend to be
unreliable, poorly calibrated, and affected by contextual factors, such as the volume of
previously heard sounds, and by the nature of the rating scale. People do better, however,
when reporting which of two sounds is louder than when rating the loudness of various sounds
on a scale. In 1927, L.L. Thurstone demonstrated that pair-wise comparison can be used to
order multiple items in a scale of strength or magnitude. L.L. Thurstone, A Law of
Comparative Judgment, 34 PSYCHOL. REV. 273 (1927). We used this method to estimate the
perceived strength of forensic science reporting statements.
76
Participants were jury-eligible U.S. adults from mTurk, an online labor pool.
77
The data were fitted to Thurstone-Mosteller paired comparison models to obtain rankordered lists of the various statements and an indication of the perceived differences among
them. See, Thurstone, supra note 75; Fredrick Mosteller, Remarks on the Method of Paired
Comparisons: I. The Least Squares Solution Assuming Equal Standard Deviations and Equal
Correlations, 16 PSYCHOMETRIKA 3 (1951); Hal Stern, A Continuum of Paired Comparisons
Models, 77 BIOMETRIKA 265 (1990).
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Some non-numerical statements about strength of support were also
perceived to be powerful. Saying that a fingerprint comparison provides
“extremely strong support” for the theory that the suspect made the print was
seen as roughly equivalent to saying that it was “a practical certainty that the
suspect was the source;” saying the comparison provides “extremely strong
support” for the theory that the suspect made the print was perceived to be
stronger than saying that it is “highly probable” the suspect made the print.
Saying a DNA match provides “extremely strong support” for the theory of
a common source was seen as roughly equivalent to saying that the RMP is
1 in 100,000 or the LR is 100,000. So our results suggest that it is possible
to make a strong statement about the probative value of a forensic
comparison by talking about strength of support rather than relying on the
traditional claim of identification/individualization.
Interestingly, simply saying that the ridge patterns of two fingerprints
“match” was also perceived to be an extremely strong statement about the
probative value of a fingerprint comparison.78 This finding raises concerns
because, as noted earlier, forensic examiners use the term “match” merely to
convey that the items share the same attributes, which does not necessarily
imply that the forensic comparison is highly probative.79 It is not clear
whether the term “match” will be equally powerful with other forms of
forensic evidence, but our findings suggest that forensic scientists should use
this term cautiously, if at all, when reporting their conclusions, particularly
when there is uncertainty about the probative value of the matching features
for proving the items have a common source.
The statement on likelihood of correspondence proposed by the
Defense Forensic Science Center of the United States Army was perceived
to be significantly weaker, when used to characterize a fingerprint
comparison, than reporting “identification” or “individualization.” It was
also weaker than saying the results provide “extremely strong support” for
the theory of a common source Relative to the RMP statements, the army
statement fell between “1 in 100,000” and “1 in 1000,” differing significantly
from both.
With regard to the verbal expressions recommended by the Association
of Forensic Science Providers (see Table 1), our findings suggest that two of
these expressions—”weak support” and “moderate support” are indeed
perceived in the manner intended. In other words, participants perceived the
verbal expression as being roughly equal in strength to the corresponding
78
People also give a great deal of weight to testimony that two hairs “match.” See Dawn
McQuiston_Surrett & Michael J. Saks, The Testimony of Forensic Identification Science:
What Experts Say and What Factfinders Hear, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 436 (2009);
McQuiston-Surrett & Saks, supra note 64.
79
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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LR. On the other hand, our participants thought the expression “extremely
strong support” was weaker than the corresponding LR.
AFSP
recommended using the term “extremely strong support” when the LR
exceeds 1 million, but our participants found “extremely strong support” to
be equivalent or weaker than a RMP of 1 in 100,000. Our findings suggest
that forensic scientists who are seeking a verbal statement comparable in
strength to a RMP of 1 in 1 million, or a LR of 1 million, more may need to
find something stronger than “extremely strong support.”
Of course, it is important to consider whether such strong statements
are warranted when describing the strength of forensic source comparisons
in disciplines other than DNA analysis. If it would be an exaggeration to
report a LR of 100,000 or higher when explaining the strength of a latent
print, tool mark, or footwear comparison, then arguably it is also an
exaggeration to say that the comparison provides “extremely strong support”
for the theory of a common source (given that “extremely strong support” is
viewed as equivalent in strength to the LR of 100,000). In this regard it is
noteworthy that the false identification rate of latent print examiners in the
largest black-box study of examiner accuracy80 was approximately 0.17%,
or one false identification for every 588 comparisons of prints from different
people for which examiners were able to reach a source conclusion.81 Even
higher error rates have been observed in some studies.82 The error rates
observed in these studies suggest that the LR describing the strength of a
latent print identification may well be closer to 1000 than to 100,000. Hence,
reporting that a latent print comparison provides “extremely strong” support
for a common source may be more than adequate to convey an accurate
impression of the strength of this evidence. In fact, if one were seeking a
verbal expression that is equivalent to reporting a LR of 1000, then the
statement proposed by the United States Army’s Defense Forensic Science
80

Bradford T. Ulery, R. Austin Hicklin, Joann Buscaglia & Maria Antonia Roberts,
Accuracy and Reliability of Forensic Latent Fingerprint Decisions, 108 PROC. NAT’L. ACAD.
SCI. 7733 (2011).
81
For an analysis of the error rates in this study, see AAAS REPORT, supra note 4, at 55
(“A total of 4083 different-source pairs were deemed of value for identification, and
examiners were able to make conclusive calls on 3638 of those pairs. Six of those calls were
erroneous identifications (0.17%)”). The PCAST report, supra note 15, also analyzed this
study and reported that the upper 95% confidence bound of the false identification rate was
0.33%, which corresponds to 1false identification for every 306 different-source comparisons
that led to a source determination.
82
See, e.g., Igor Pacheco, Brian Cerchiai & Stephanie Stoiloff, Miami-Dade Research
Study for the Reliability of the ACE-V Process: Accuracy & Precision in Latent Fingerprint
Examinations, MIAMI DADE POLICE DEP’T FORENSIC SERVS. BUREAU (Dec. 2014), https://ww
w.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/248534.pdf. For detailed discussion of error rates in latent
print examinations, see AAAS REPORT, supra note 4; Simon A. Cole, More than Zero:
Accounting for Error in Latent Fingerprint Identification, 95 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 985
(2005).
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Center83 would be a more reasonable choice.
One must be cautious about arguments of this kind, however, because
they rely on research that compares the perceived strength of various
possible reporting statements relative to one another. It seems reasonable to
infer that people will give roughly equal weight to a latent print comparison
when the examiner reports a LR of 100,000 as when the examiner reports
that the comparison provides “extremely strong support” for a common
source. But the research discussed thus far does not tell us whether the
weight given to the evidence when presented in either manner will be
appropriate. People may see the statements as roughly equivalent in strength
but may give both statements more weight or less weight than they deserve.
Readers should also bear in mind that participants in these studies were
responding to short written summaries of the examiners’ conclusions about
fingerprint and DNA comparisons, similar to what might be found in a
written report. The same statements may well be viewed differently when
presented in connection with other types of forensic evidence. It is also
possible that people will respond differently to such conclusions when
examiners have the opportunity to explain and elaborate upon them during
testimony. In order to resolve these questions, additional research is needed
on how widely these finding generalize across evidence types and
presentation modalities.
B. Assessing the Appropriateness of Lay Responses to Forensic
Science Evidence
What is an “appropriate” response to a forensic scientist’s testimony?
How do we determine whether a particular juror’s conclusions are based on
clear-eyed understanding of the expert’s testimony, rather than a biased or
incorrect distortion thereof? Suppose, for example, that a shift in reporting
format—from “individualization” to LRs, for example—produces a change
in lay reactions to forensic science evidence. How do we judge whether that
change is harmful or beneficial? In the sections that follow, I will propose
two criteria for assessing appropriateness: whether people’s responses are
sensitive to the strength of the forensic evidence, and whether people’s
responses are logically consistent with the forensic evidence.84

83

See supra note 42, and accompanying text.
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26, proposed three criteria for evaluating the
appropriateness of reactions to forensic science evidence, which they called sensitivity,
logical coherence, and susceptibility to fallacy. In the analysis presented here, I combine the
second and third of these categories.
84
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1. Sensitivity to the Strength of Evidence
If people are responding to forensic evidence appropriately, their
judgments should be sensitive to the strength of the forensic evidence. They
should give more weight to forensic evidence when it is strong and therefore
deserves more weight; they should give less weight to forensic evidence
when it is weak and therefore deserves less weight. Consequently, we should
prefer presentation formats that promote sensitivity to the strength of
evidence, and avoid presentation formats that render people insensitive to
the strength of evidence.
Several studies have examined lay people’s sensitivity to variations in
RMPs when evaluating forensic science evidence in hypothetical criminal
cases. The majority of these studies found that people give more weight to
the forensic evidence when the RMP is low than when it is higher, as they
should.85 There were two exceptions in which variations in RMP did have a
statistically significant effect on the weight given to forensic evidence,86 but
the literature as a whole suggests that people understand and respond
appropriately to this variable. This conclusion is bolstered by the recent
research my colleagues and I conducted on perceptions of the relative
strength of reporting statements. When we asked people to compare two
statements about RMPs for DNA or fingerprint evidence, most people
correctly perceived the statement with the lower RMP to be stronger.87
Whether people are also sensitive to variations in LRs and Strength of
Support Statements is less clear. Martire and her colleagues have reported
that people “were only weakly sensitive to large differences” in LRs and
Strength-of-Support statements when evaluating shoeprint evidence.88
Thompson and Newman89 also found that people were insensitive to LRs and
Strength-of-Support statements when evaluating shoeprint evidence, but
found that people were sensitive to these variables when evaluating DNA
85

David L. Faigman & A.J. Baglioni, Jr., Bayes’ Theorem in the Trial Process:
Instructing Jurors on the Value of Statistical Evidence, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1988);
Goodman, supra note 67 (Study 2); Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger
C. Park, Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (1996);
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.
86
Goodman, supra note 67 (Study 1) (reporting that varying match frequencies of 10%,
5%, 1% and 0.1% produced only slight changes in participants’ reactions to blood group
evidence); Koehler, supra note 71 (finding no significant differences in reactions to a match
frequency of 1 in 100 versus 1 in 1000 in a DNA case).
87
Thompson, Grady, Lai & Stern, supra note 74. A minority of participants in these
studies initially said the statement with the higher RMP was stronger, but most of them
realized their error when given additional explanation.
88
Martire et al., 2013, supra note 26; see also Kristy A. Martire et al., On the
Interpretation of Likelihood Ratios in Forensic Science Evidence: Presentation Formats and
the Weak Evidence Effect, 240 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 61 (2014).
89
Supra note 26.
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evidence. Thompson and Newman speculated that people’s preconceptions
about forensic evidence may have made them skeptical when experts
presented large LRs and strong Strength-of-Support statements in
connection with shoeprint evidence, but more accepting of such statements
when offered in connection with DNA evidence.90 Additional research to
follow up on these findings is clearly warranted.
The studies by Martire et al. and by Thompson and Newman required
participants to evaluate written summaries of evidence. In a more recent set
of studies, my colleagues and I have asked participants to view videos of
simulated testimony by a forensic voice comparison expert who used
likelihood ratios to describe the strength of his findings, and offered a clear
explanation of what a LR is. These studies found that participants’
judgments were sensitive to the strength of the reported LR—they gave
significantly more weight to the voice print evidence when the reported LR
was 3000 than when it was thirty.91 While these findings are reassuring with
respect to LRs, much more research is needed to test people’s understanding
of LRs and Strength of Support statements.
There is has been relative little research on lay reactions to the kind of
error rate data recommended by PCAST, although the reported studies
indicate people can be sensitive to error rate data. Thompson, Kaasa &
Peterson92 found that undergraduates were sensitive to the probability of a
false match when evaluating the strength of DNA evidence. In a second
study they found that members of a jury pool did not necessarily accept an
expert’s estimate of the probability of a false DNA match due to laboratory
error, although their assessments of the strength of the DNA evidence varied
appropriately in accordance with their own estimates of the probability of a
false match.
In an earlier study, Kaasa et al. found that undergraduate participants in
a jury simulation study gave more weight to bullet lead evidence when they
were provided with statistical data suggesting it had strong “diagnostic
value” than when the data suggested the evidence was worthless (nondiagnostic), or when no data were presented.93 Interestingly, the study found
90
Interestingly, Thompson and Newman also found that judgments about shoeprint
evidence were sensitive to variations in RMPs. People tended to give more weight to
shoeprint evidence when the RMP was low (1 in 1 million) than when it was more moderate
(1 in 1000), but a similar variation in LRs produced no effect.
91
William C. Thompson, Rebecca Grady & Eryn J. Newman, Lay Understanding of
Likelihood Ratios Presented by a Forensic Voice Comparison Expert (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
92
Supra note 27.
93
Suzanne O. Kaasa, Tiamovo Peterson, Erin K. Morris & William C. Thompson,
Statistical Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match, 31 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2007). Participants were asked to judge the value of bullet lead evidence
for proving a bullet found at a crime scene came from a stock of bullets owned by a defendant.
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that group deliberation improved participants’ ability to draw conclusions
from the statistical data. It was only after group deliberation that participants
appreciated that the bullet lead evidence deserved no weight in the condition
where statistical data indicated the evidence was non-diagnostic and was
therefore worthless. The study also found variation across participants in
their sensitivity to variations in the statistical data. Participants who
expressed more confidence in their ability to understand and use numerical
data were more likely to respond to the statistical data in the appropriate
manner (by giving weight to the evidence only when the data indicated it had
diagnostic value), while those who expressed less confidence were
insensitive to the variation in statistical data.
A recent study on people’s reaction to negative evidence—the failure
to detect gunshot residue on an individual suspected of firing a gun—found
that participants recruited from an online database were sensitive to
statistical data about the probability of detection, although the authors note
that “jurors may evaluate negative evidence according to a fairly crude
metric—-giving it no weight if the probability of detection is zero, a great
deal of weight if the probability of detection is 100%, and moderate weight
if the probability of detection is somewhere in between.” 94
2. Logical Coherence
A second criterion for evaluating whether people are responding to
forensic science evidence appropriately is whether their responses follow
logically from the evidence. If a particular presentation format causes people
to respond to the evidence in a manner that is illogical, or logically
incoherent,95 that is cause for concern. Researchers have often used Bayes’
rule as a normative standard for determining whether people’s responses to
forensic evidence are logical.96
Statistics were provided on the probability of finding bullets matching the chemical profile of
a crime scene bullet among the defendant’s stock of bullets and the probability of finding such
bullets among a sample of bullets found in the broader community were the crime occurred.
When the former probability greatly exceeded the latter, the evidence was deemed diagnostic
(meaning it has strong probative value); when the two probabilities were equal, the evidence
was non-diagnostic, meaning it had no probative value for determining whether the crime
scene bullet came from the defendant or someone else.
94
William C. Thompson, Nicholas Scurich, Rachel Dioso-Villa & Brenda Velazquez,
Evaluating Negative Forensic Evidence: When Do Jurors Treat Absence of Evidence as
Evidence of Absence?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 569, 569 (2017).
95
Logical incoherence consists of holding beliefs that are logically inconsistent with one
another. See Thompson & Newman, supra note 26. An example of incoherence would be a
person who believes that the chances of a false DNA match are extraordinarily low (which
implies that the DNA evidence deserves a lot of weight), but who updates his beliefs about
the source of an item relatively little after receiving the DNA evidence (which implies that
the DNA evidence deserves little weight).
96
See infra note 97. Bayes’ rule is a formal description of how a rational actor should
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i. Underutilization of Forensic Evidence
A number of researchers have concluded that people “underutilize”
forensic science, which means that they give less weight to the evidence than
would be logical, given their beliefs about it.97 Based on this conclusion,
some scholars have argued that we need not fear that forensic science
evidence will be overvalued and prejudicial, and that forensic scientists
should favor presentation formats that maximize the impact of forensic
science evidence in order to combat the tendency toward underutilization.
Several commentators have suggested, for example, that jurors be instructed
on Bayesian updating in order to help them appreciate the strength of
forensic evidence and overcome their tendency to give it too little weight.98
I am skeptical of this conclusion. While the research shows patterns of
judgment that deviate from Bayesian norms, “underutilization” of forensic
evidence is not the only possible explanation. Many of the studies in this
literature have methodological limitations that may have created a false
appearance of “underutilization.” Some of the studies used incomplete
Bayesian models that failed to account for all possible sources of uncertainty.
Participants in these studies may have updated their beliefs less than the
Bayesian model specified because they were legitimately skeptical about the
evidence for reasons not taken into account by the Bayesian models, rather
than because their judgments were illogical.99 A false appearance of
update beliefs about a particular hypothesis (or about a pair of alternative hypotheses) in light
of new evidence. ROBERTSON, VIGNAUX & BERGER, supra note 5. Researchers can use
Bayesian analysis to assess whether forensic science evidence causes people to change their
beliefs about the source of an item in a manner that is logically consistent with their beliefs
about the forensic evidence. For example, several researchers have used Bayesian models to
determine how DNA evidence should affect a rational actor’s belief about the probability that
a defendant was the source of a biological sample, given the actor’s beliefs about the
probability that the DNA evidence could falsely implicate the defendant through such
mechanisms as a coincidental match, examiner error, or a frame up. The models are, in effect,
statements about the logical consistency of various beliefs a person might hold.
97
Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66; Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 86;
Goodman, supra note 67; Brian C. Smith, Steven D. Penrod, Amy L. Otto & Roger C. Park,
Jurors’ Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 49 (1996); Jason Schklar &
Shari Seidman Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: Errors and Expectancies, 23
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (1999); Nance & Morris (2002), supra note 72; Nance & Morris
(2005), supra note 72; Martire et al. supra note 26, but see Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson,
supra note 27 (finding both underutilization and overutilization of forensic DNA evidence).
98
This suggestion was first put forth in 1970. See Michael O. Finkelstein and William
B. Fairley, A Bayesian Approach to Identification Evidence, 83 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1970). It
drew a famous response from Laurence Tribe, who objected to what he regarded as an
unwarranted intrusion of mathematics into the trial process. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by
Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). But
suggestion that jurors be instructed on Bayesian updating, as a means of mitigating
“underutilization,” have continued. See, e.g., Faigman & Baglioni, supra note 85; Nance &
Morris (2005), supra note 72.
99
For details on this issue, see Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27, at 361;
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underutilization might also have arisen from the use of probability elicitation
methods that artificially restricted the range of possible responses, and hence
the degree to which people could express changes in their beliefs after
receiving forensic evidence. Ceiling effects—the well known tendency of
people to avoid using the extreme ends of a response scale—may have
created a false appearance of “underutilization” in some studies by making
it difficult for some participants to indicate how much their beliefs had
changed.100
Beyond the methodological issues, there are theoretical reasons to
question the conclusion that people underutilize forensic evidence.
Psychologists have long recognized that ordinary people do not think like
Bayesians.101 According to contemporary psychological theory, people
employ a variety of heuristic strategies for evaluating evidence and updating
beliefs—strategies that generally work well but can produce counternormative judgments in specific situations.102 Jonathan Koehler has
extended these theories to encompass forensic evidence, showing how
variations in reporting format can produce predictable variation in peoples’
evaluations of the strength of forensic comparisons.103 While these theories
predict that people’s judgments will sometimes deviate from Bayesian
norms, it is difficult to see why the underlying cognitive processes posited
by the theories would cause a systematic tendency to underutilize forensic
evidence, rather than errors that could lead either to underutilization or
overutilization depending on the specific circumstances.
My colleagues and I have recently re-visited the question of people’s
consistency with Bayesian norms using more complete Bayesian models and
improved probability elicitation methods designed to avoid ceiling effects.
Our studies present a somewhat different picture than previous studies, at
least for DNA evidence. Thompson, Kaasa and Peterson found that people
evaluating DNA evidence (participants included actual jurors) generally
responded to it in a manner consistent with Bayesian norms; under some
circumstances DNA evidence caused people’s judgments to shift more than
Bayesian norms would dictate—suggesting that they may have given too

Thompson & Newman, supra note 26, at 334.
100
The potential for ceiling effects in this research is discussed in Smith et al., supra note
97; Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27; Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.
101
See Spellman, supra note 26; Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective
Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 450 (1972) (“. . .
man is apparently not a conservative Bayesian: he is not Bayesian at all”).
102
See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCI. 1124 (1974), http://psiexp.ss.uci.edu/research/teaching/Tver
sky_Kahneman_1974.pdf; JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTIES: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3
(Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
103
See Koehler (2001), supra note 69; Koehler & Maachi, supra note 70.
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much weight to the DNA evidence.104
Thompson and Newman also found that people’s responses to DNA
evidence were consistent with Bayesian norms, but found people violated
Bayesian norms when they evaluated shoeprint evidence.105 People gave less
weight to shoeprint evidence than the Bayesian model said they should even
after taking into account their beliefs about the probability of a coincidental
match, lab error and frame-up. People apparently perceived shoeprint
evidence to be weak (relative to DNA evidence) in ways that were not
captured by the Bayesian model. Thompson and Newman suggest that
people’s reactions to forensic evidence are complex and are influenced by a
number of variables. Impressions about the value of evidence and the
credibility of experts that have been shaped by popular culture may be as
important as the words experts speak in determining the weight people give
to forensic evidence.
While there are reasons to be skeptical of claims that people inevitably,
or systematically, underutilize forensic science evidence, there clearly is
much we do not know about factors affecting the weight people give this
evidence. Additional research is needed on how people weigh various
factors that affect the probative value of forensic evidence, such as the
probability of a coincidental match, a false incrimination due to laboratory
error, or a frame up. It would also be useful to explore whether people’s
beliefs about error rates, match probabilities, and related matters are
reasonable (i.e., consistent with the best evidence), and how those beliefs are
affected by the way forensic examiners present their conclusions. If
misconceptions are distorting their views of the value of forensic evidence,
that issue will need to be addressed as well.
ii. Fallacious Reasoning
Another kind of logical incoherence can be caused by people’s
tendency to evaluate forensic science using illogical strategies that arise from
a fundamental misunderstanding of probabilistic evidence. One error, often
called the prosecutor’s fallacy, arises from mistakenly assuming that a
random match probability equates to the probability the defendant is
innocent.106 As Thompson and Newman have explained:
104

Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27. The evidence for “overutilization” of
DNA evidence occurred when random match probability was extremely low (1 in 1 trillion)
but the probability of a false match due to cross-contamination in the laboratory was much
higher (1 in 100). Participants may have had difficulty aggregating data on the probability of
a coincidental match with data on the probability of a false match due to lab error, causing
them to discount insufficiently for the latter source of error.
105
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.
106
See Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66; Nance and Morris (2002), supra note 72;
Nance and Morris (2005) supra note 72; David H. Kaye, Valerie P. Hans, B. Michael Dann,
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. . . people sometimes mistakenly assume that they can infer the
probability that matching items have (or do not have) a common
source from the random match probability (RMP). If an expert
reports that a defendant matches a DNA sample and that the
probability a random person would match is 1 in 1 million, for
example, people sometimes assume that this necessarily means
there is one chance in a million that the DNA sample came from
someone other than the defendant—a mistake of logic that has
been called the “source probability error” and the “fallacy of the
transposed conditional.” . . . In cases where the defendant’s
identity as the perpetrator is the sole issue . . . people sometimes
mistakenly equate the RMP with the probability the defendant is
innocent—an error known as “the prosecutor’s fallacy” . . . .107
Thompson and Newman found that people are susceptible to the same
error when evaluating LRs:
The same erroneous logic (arising from transposition of
conditional probabilities) might also lead to fallacious
interpretation of likelihood ratios. If an expert says the DNA
evidence is one million times more likely if the defendant, rather
than a random person, is the source of a sample, for example, then
people might mistakenly assume that this means it is one million
times more likely that the defendant, rather than a random person,
is the source of the sample.108
In either case, the fallacy may cause a serious misinterpretation of the
evidence. “. . . The danger of this fallacy is that it leads people to think they
can determine the probability the defendant is (or is not) the source from the
forensic evidence alone, without considering the other evidence.”109
The key issues for researchers are how often people fall victim to
fallacious reasoning, how much these logical errors influence their
judgments, and whether people’s susceptibility to error is influenced by the
presentation format used by the forensic scientist.
Researchers have provided a wide range of estimates of how frequently
people fall victim to the prosecutor’s fallacy. Differences across studies are
Erin Farley & Stephanie Albertson, Statistics in the Jury Box: How Jurors Respond to
Mitochondrial DNA Match Probabilities, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 797 (2007);
Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27.
107
See supra note 26 at 335.
108
Id.
109
Id.
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due in part to ways in which researchers judged whether people were making
fallacious judgments. A common approach is to assume participants are
committing the prosecutor’s fallacy when they judge the probability of the
defendant’s guilt to be the exact complement of the random match
probability. Thompson and Schumann110 found that 13.2% of participants
judged the probability of the defendant’s guilt to be exactly 98% (which was
higher than Bayesian norms) in a case in which the defendant was linked to
the crime by serological evidence and the random match probability was 2%.
These participants defended their conclusion with fallacious arguments,
suggesting, for example, that because there was only a 2% chance the
defendant would have “matched” if he was innocent, the evidence of the
match implies a 98% chance that he is guilty. However, the percentage of
participants who made judgments consistent with the prosecutor’s fallacy
dropped to only 3% in a second study111 in which participants read lawyers’
arguments about the strength of the forensic evidence. In subsequent studies,
the percentage making judgments consistent with the prosecutor’s fallacy
has varied but it was generally low.112 The frequency of judgments
consistent with the prosecutor’s fallacy undoubtedly depends, in part, on
how the random match probability is presented and explained to the jury and
on how easy it is for participants to express such judgments.113
The studies cited so far judged whether people committed the
prosecutor’s fallacy by seeing whether their estimate of the probability of
guilt was the exact complement of the random match probability. This is a
rather exacting requirement and may underestimate the number of people
who are confused by fallacious reasoning. Thompson and Newman114 took
a different approach. After participants had reviewed the trial evidence, they
presented the participants with a series of statements regarding the
implications of the forensic science evidence and asked participants which
110

Supra note 66 (Study 1).
Id. (Study 2).
112
2% in Goodman, supra note 67; 4% in Smith et al., supra note 97; 6% in Nance and
Morris (2002), supra note 72; 0.3% in Nance & Morris (2005), supra note 72; but an estimated
16% in Kaye et al., supra note 106.
113
One reason for the low percentage (0.3%) in Nance & Morris (2005), supra note 72,
for example, may have been that the random match probability was 1 in 40,000 (or 0.000025),
as a consequence of which the researchers coded participants’ judgments as consistent with
the prosecutor’s fallacy only if they said the probability of guilt was exactly 0.999975
(99.9975%). As the researchers acknowledged, some participants who fell victim to
fallacious reasoning may have been missed in this assessment because they miscalculated the
percentage, or simply rounded to 99%. In a case involving mtDNA evidence where the RMP
was less than 1%, Kaye et al., supra note 106, found that 48% of mock jurors agreed with the
proposition that “the mtDNA evidence in this case shows that there is about a 1% chance that
someone else besides the defendant committed the crime.” But the researchers argued that
jurors could have arrived at this conclusion without committing the prosecutor’s fallacy.
114
Supra note 26.
111
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statements were a correct interpretation of what the expert had said. Some
of the statements correctly indicated that the expert had testified about the
probability of the observed results given the hypotheses.115 Other statements
incorrectly transposed the conditional and indicated that the expert had
testified about the probability that the same-source hypothesis is true given
the observed results. Nearly two-thirds of participants who heard testimony
about RMPs or LRs thought the “correct interpretation” was a statement that
transposed the conditional—suggesting a high level of misunderstanding.
Furthermore, participants who chose the fallacious statement as a “correct
interpretation” were more likely to have voted in favor of convicting the
defendant—suggesting that misinterpretations of the expert’s statistical
statements can have important consequences.
In a subsequent study, Thompson, Grady and Newman116 asked
participants to evaluate simulated testimony by a voice comparison expert,
who presented and explained likelihood ratios. About 80% of these
participants thought the “correct interpretation” of the expert’s testimony
was a statement that transposed the conditional probabilities.117 Those who
agreed with the fallacious interpretation also gave more weight to the voice
comparison evidence when assessing the defendant’s guilt.
When evaluating forensic science evidence, people sometimes fall
victim to another logical error called the “defense attorney’s fallacy.”118
Victims of this fallacy mistakenly assume that a forensic match has little or
no probative value for incriminating the defendant if someone other than the
defendant could also have matched. This error may cause people to
underutilize forensic evidence, or ignore it entirely, when evaluating a
case.119
Finally, researchers regularly observe a third kind of logical error—
some people respond to forensic evidence by changing their beliefs in the
wrong direction. Generally this happens when people respond to forensic
evidence that is reported to be weakly incriminating by revising downward
their belief in the probability of the defendant’s guilt, hence it has been called
115
Experts who presented RMPs were testifying about the probability of the observed
results given the hypothesis that the items being compared had a different source; experts who
presented LRs were testifying about the relative probability of the observed results under the
two alternative hypotheses—i.e., same-source or different-source.
116
Supra note 91.
117
The expert had testified that the evidence observed in the forensic comparison of
voices was either 30 or 3000 times more likely if the defendant was the speaker on a contested
recording than if the speaker was another individual from the relevant population. The
statement that 80% of participants viewed as the “correct interpretation” said the expert had
testified that it was 30 or 3000 times more likely that the defendant was the speaker given the
evidence observed in the forensic comparison of voices.
118
Thompson & Schumann, supra note 66; Thompson, Kaasa & Peterson, supra note 27.
119
Thompson & Newman, supra note 26.
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a “weak evidence effect.”120 When Martire and her colleagues asked people
to evaluate shoeprint evidence and fingerprint evidence that incriminated a
defendant, they found that a majority of participants revised their belief in
the defendant’s guilt downward when the expert explained the strength of
the evidence by saying it provided “weak or limited support” for the
hypothesis that the defendant was the source of an incriminating item at the
crime scene.121 One possible explanation for this finding is that participants
misunderstood the expert’s statement about the strength of the evidence for
supporting the hypotheses as a statement about the probability that the
hypothesis is true. In other words, this phenomenon may be another
manifestation of confusion over conditional probabilities.
V.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

I began this Article by suggesting two criteria for determining the way
forensic scientists should report source conclusions: (1) whether the reported
conclusions can be justified logically and empirically; and (2) whether the
reported conclusions will be understood and used appropriately. In the
discussion that followed, I suggested that some of the most commonly used
forensic reporting formats fail (or might fail) the first criterion.
There is legitimate skepticism in the broader scientific community
about claims that examiners in pattern-matching disciplines can link an item
to a single possible source by discerning that the item has unique features.
Consequently, forensic examiners are on shaky ground when they claim to
have “identified” or “individualized” the source of a trace or impression
found at a crime scene. Concern about this problem has prompted discussion
among forensic scientists about the possibility of reporting source
conclusions in different ways. One of my goals in writing this Article is to
provide a helpful perspective to forensic scientists regarding possible
options.
There is also reason to be skeptical about reporting source probabilities
(e.g., claiming a “99% chance” or a “high probability” that items have a
common source) because forensic examiners must consider or make
assumptions about matters beyond their scientific expertise to draw
conclusions about source probabilities. Source probabilities are hybrid
conclusions, based partly on the examiner’s analysis of the physical
characteristics of the items being compared, and partly on the examiner’s
assumptions or conclusions about the strength of other evidence that bears
on whether the items have a common source.122 Whether hybrid conclusions
120

Martire et al. (2013), supra note 26; Martire et al. (2014), supra note 88.
Martire et al. (2013), supra note 26.
122
The same problems arise when examiners “identify” items as having the same source
based, in part, on consideration of the prior odds (a process that I called “identification without
121
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of this kind should even be admissible is a question evidence scholars should
consider, given the danger that testimony of this type will invade the
province of the trier-of-fact and the potential for confusion and doublecounting that arises when the expert’s conclusion rests (to an extent that may
be unclear) on evidence the trier-of-fact will also consider, and may view
differently.123 If forensic scientists continue to present source probabilities,
they should develop standards for disclosure of the examiner’s underlying
assumptions or evaluations about the prior odds, so that recipients will have
a clearer understanding of the basis for these conclusions.
There are many possible alternatives to reporting “identification” or
source probabilities, some of which require presenting numbers (LRs and
RMPs) and some of which involve qualitative statements (about strength-ofsupport or likelihood of correspondence). Experts can reach these
conclusions based solely on evaluation of the physical features of the items
being compared, without making assumptions about the prior odds of a
common source, so these approaches avoid the foundational problems of
source probabilities. Of course, questions can and should be raised about the
validity of these conclusions. When these conclusions rest on databases and
statistical models, the appropriateness of the databases and the validity of the
models must be considered. When these conclusions rest on subjective
assessment of the relevant likelihoods, serious questions should be asked
about how accurately examiners can make the necessary subjective
assessments. We need thoughtful analysis of such questions in order to
decide what forensic scientists should be allowed to say about source
conclusions in reports and testimony.
The PCAST report suggested that forensic scientists validate subjective
methods by conducting black-box studies to determine their accuracy.124
Examiners could then explain the probative value of their conclusions by
presenting data on true and false positive rates. For example, a latent print
examiner could report “identification” of a particular suspect as the source
of a latent print, but would then say, for example, that the rate of false
identifications could be as high as 1 in 306 based on error rate data from
black-box studies.125 The introduction of error rate data changes the nature
uniqueness).
123
I am aware of no cases in which litigants have raised foundational challenges to such
testimony, but that may reflect a failure of lawyers and judges to appreciate that such
conclusions require examiners to make assumptions or take positions on matters beyond their
scientific expertise. Acceptance of such testimony may well diminish once lawyers and
judges come to appreciate the problematic nature of the underlying logic.
124
According to the PCAST report, latent print examination is the only forensic discipline
for which appropriate black-box studies currently exist.
125
There will inevitably be controversy about the exact numbers examiners use to report
error rates. A false identification rate of 1 in 306 is PCAST’s calculation of the upper 95%
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of examiner’s report from a straightforward, unqualified statement that the
same-source hypothesis is true, to a statement that the examiner has made a
determination that is diagnostic, in a probabilistic manner, of whether the
same-source hypothesis is true. Reports in this form would better meet the
first criterion of being justified logically and empirically.
The second criterion for determining how forensic scientists should
present source conclusions is whether the reported conclusions will be
understood and used appropriately. As forensic scientists contemplate the
possibility of shifting from traditional reporting formats (e.g.,
“identification,” source probabilities) to alternatives (e.g., LRs, strength-ofsupport statements), questions will inevitably arise about lay reaction to
alternative reporting formats. The research reviewed here should allay
concerns that people will dismiss or give little weight to statements about
LRs, strength of support, match frequency or likelihood of correspondence.
The alternative formats can be influential. Whether people will give such
statements the correct weight, however, is a much harder question about
which there remains much uncertainty.
Over the past few years, it has become increasingly clear that fallacious
interpretation of forensic science testimony can have important
consequences. Hence, it is important to look for ways to avoid these errors.
For example, it is worth considering Professor Friedman’s suggestion that
judges provide explicit, detailed instructions on this issue.126 In some cases
there may also be a need for expert testimony to explain to the jury what
would and would not be a proper inference from forensic science evidence.
While expert testimony on this topic might be resisted as an effort to tell
jurors how to think, the social science evidence suggests that on this issue
they may need the help.
If efforts to educate jurors (and lawyers) about these errors prove
fruitless, as Professor Spellman fears,127 we will then need to consider
whether it makes sense to avoid presenting forensic science findings in ways
that are conducive to these errors. That might mean avoiding quantitative
likelihood ratios and random match probabilities, although careful thought
should be given to whether the disease is sufficiently serious to warrant such
confidence bound of the false identification rate in the largest black-box study of latent print
examiners. See supra note 81. For additional commentary on error rate estimation in forensic
science, see PCAST REPORT, supra note 15; Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Views of the
Commission: Facilitating Research on Laboratory Performance, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE &
NIST (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/909311/download;
Jonathan J. Koehler, Forensics or Fauxrensics? Ascertaining Accuracy in the Forensic
Sciences, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1369 (2018).
126
Richard D. Friedman, Controlling the Jury-Teaching Function, 48 SETON HALL L.
REV. 815 (2018).
127
Spellman, supra note 26.
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a drastic cure. That will depend, of course, on whether there are alternative
presentation methods that work better—which we can only assess if we have
yet more research on lay reactions to forensic evidence. For researchers
interested in these issues, there is much more work to be done.
In an ideal world, forensic examiners would always present their
findings in a manner that causes people to respond to the evidence in a
manner commensurate with its probative value. If those receiving the
evidence gave it too much, or too little weight, the reporting format could be
tweaked to correct the problem. Forensic scientists would report their
findings in the format that assured the best calibration between the probative
value of the evidence and lay reactions to the evidence.
We are a long way from that ideal world, but I hope this Article
provided some glimpses of what that world might look like and how we
might move toward it. First, we need much better information about the
probative value of the forensic identification evidence produced in each
forensic science discipline. It would be useful to develop and apply a
common metric for measuring the probative value of forensic evidence, such
as a likelihood ratio. The probative value of a particular conclusion could be
evaluated by assessing (through research studies) how frequently examiners
reach that conclusion when comparing items known to be from the same
source, relative to how frequently they reach that conclusion when
comparing items known to be from different sources. The ratio of the two
frequencies (which is essentially a LR) describes the strength of the evidence
for proving the items have a common source. The PCAST report128 and the
AAAS report on latent print identification129 each include extensive
discussion of how such studies might be designed and carried out.
Second, we need more and better research on whether people respond
to forensic evidence in a manner commensurate with its value, and on how
their responses vary for different presentation formats. By combining
assessment of the probative value of the evidence with assessment of
people’s reactions to it, we can help assure that responses are properly
calibrated so that people give the evidence the weight it deserves.
Consider, for example, how we might evaluate the suitability of the
reporting statement for latent print evidence proposed by the Defense
Forensic Science Center of the United States Army.130 We first must
understand the probative value of this evidence. That requires data on the
relative probability that an Army latent print examiner will issue such a
report after comparing prints made by the same finger, and after comparing

128
129
130

Supra note 15.
Supra note 15.
See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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prints made by different fingers. The ratio of these two probabilities is a
likelihood ratio (LR) that can be used to describe the probative value of the
conclusion for proving the prints come from the same finger. We need to
know roughly the magnitude of this LR—is it 100, 1000, 10,000 or more?
We cannot determine whether people are responding appropriately to the
Army’s latent print evidence, after hearing the proposed reporting statement,
until we know how much weight this evidence deserves.
The second step is to assess the weight that people give to the evidence,
using the kind of research discussed in this Article. If we determine that a
LR of 1000 describes the probative value of this evidence, then we can assess
whether people think the reporting statement is as strong as reports about
other evidence with a LR of 1000, and whether they update their beliefs after
hearing this evidence in a manner logically commensurate with evidence of
that value.
We are not yet able to make the kind of evaluation just described, but
we have already taken some substantial steps toward that imagined future. I
hope this Article will help guide us closer to that goal.

